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‘Enjoy Your Self’: Lotze on Self-Concern and Self-Consciousness 
Mark Textor 
 
Abstract: Current work on first-person thought takes its distinctive feature to be 
epistemological. First-person thinking is non-observational and immune to errors to 
which other varieties of thought about us are open. In contrast, the nineteenth century 
philosopher Hermann Lotze (1817-81) put the distinctive concern we have for the 
object of first-person thought at the center of his account. His arguments suggest that 
first-person thought is essentially evaluative. In this paper I will reconstruct and 
defend the core of Lotze’s view of self-consciousness. 
 
1. Introduction 
Imagine observing a person that you seem to see through a window. You notice that 
their hair needs to be cut and their shirt is crumpled. But you have no particular 
concern for the person you see and soon your attention wanders off. However, if you 
had realized that what looked like a window was actually a mirror and that you are 
this person, things would have been very different. For each of us takes a unique 
concern in him or herself and what belongs to him or herself. William James 
comments that the ‘altogether unique kind of interest which each human mind feels in 
those parts of creation which it can call me or mine may be a moral riddle, but it is a 
fundamental psychological fact’ (James 1890 I, 289). Here I will only be concerned 
with the psychological fact.  
What constitutes the difference between what is me or mine and what is not-
me or mine such that what is I or mine has this unique kind of interest for me? 
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 Herman Lotze’s (1817-81) answer to his question was very influential in the 
19th century.1 Lotze’s starting point is the thought that felt evaluations – taking 
pleasure in or being pained by something – are the source of the distinction between 
us and the rest of the universe. These evaluations are also the source of our first-
person concept; on them ‘will in each later development rest the distinctive intimacy 
of self-reference [Innigkeit der Zurückbeziehung] which belongs to the concept of self 
[…]’ (Lotze 1846, 128; my translation).2 Lotze takes it therefore to be a mistake to 
explain the first-person concept as, roughly, the thinker of these thoughts. Doing so 
severs the connection between first-person thought and felt evaluations and we end up 
with a reflexive, but not a first-person concept.  
In this paper I will reconstruct and develop Lotze’s evaluative view of mental 
ownership and first-person thought. I will argue that his view of mental ownership 
cannot be defended: if a thinker takes pleasure or pain in a mental activity, it is hers. 
Lotze’s condition is sufficient, but we will see that it is not necessary. However, felt 
evaluations are necessary for a thinker to acquire and exercise a genuine first-person 
concept and not merely a reflexive concept. The first-person concept is a ‘thick’ 
concept: it is in part evaluative. The value and interest of Lotze’s discussion of felt 
evaluation lies therefore mainly in the light it sheds on first-person thinking.  
The plan of the paper is as follows: I will start by introducing the distinction 
between self and not-self (sect. 2). In section 3 I will outline two ways to draw this 
distinction: (a) the distinction is drawn by a relation to the will as Fichte and his 
followers argued or (b) by epistemic properties as contemporary authors hold. 3 
Lotze’s arguments put pressure on both (a) and (b); the arguments are based on 
intuitions elicited by his comparison between a worm that squirms in pain with an 
affectless angel. Lotze suggests that the worm is better off than the angel: it possesses 
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at least the beginnings of self-consciousness while this achievement is out of reach for 
the angel (sect. 4). In section 5 I will assess the view of mental ownership Lotze 
proposed in response to the worm/angel comparison. According to Lotze, first-person 
thought (‘self-consciousness’) rests on felt evaluations. In section 6 I will reconstruct 
his diagnosis of the tempting mistake to ignore felt evaluation in an account of the 
first-person concept and to hold that this concept is exhaustively characterized by its 
reflexivity. In section 7 I will make a proposal about how to correct the mistake in the 
spirit of Lotze’s approach.  
 
2. The Unparalleled Distinction between Self and Not-Self 
If you are like me, you will easily conceive of yourself and distinguish yourself, 
including your body, from the rest of the universe. Lotze brings out how remarkable 
this distinction is: 
 
Our distinction of ourselves from things does not resemble that which we 
make between two other objects; on the contrary, the contrast between 
ourselves and what is not ourselves manifests itself as unconditioned in 
meaning and extent, and not to be compared with any other. (Lotze 1885 I, 
249/1856, 270-1) 
 
The distinction between myself and everything else is of incomparable importance 
and the importance of the distinction manifests itself in various ways. Compare, for 
example, the property of being my experience (thought) with the property of being 
bitter. Whether you draw the distinction between bitter and not-bitter depends on your 
desires and, broadly speaking, interests. If I take something to be bitter (not-bitter), I 
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may take an interest in it or not. It is perfectly possible to regard something as bitter 
(not-bitter) and have no desires with regard to it; one may be perfectly neutral. 
Whether one takes an interest in the bitter object depends on one’s desires. However, 
if x is my experience or thought, I am not neutral with respect to it; I take an interest 
in it, independently of what my further desires are. This is what Lotze has in mind, I 
think, when he talks about the unconditioned nature of the distinction between self 
and not-self. We seek to make the me/not-me distinction independently of other 
interests or desires we have.4 There is no such general drive to draw other 
distinctions. Neither Lotze nor James explains the unique kind of interest further. 
They take for granted that it is clear to us what this interest is when we reflect on what 
we call ‘me’ or ‘mine’ and how we feel about it in contrast to what we call ‘yours’. I 
will follow them in this point. 
 
3. Lotze’s Competitors: Fichteans and the Epistemic View 
Let us consider the distinction between the self and the non-self to which we attach 
incomparable value and everything else (‘the self/non-self distinction’ for short). We 
can ask three questions about the self/non-self distinction: 
 
The Constitutive Question: What constitutes the self/non-self distinction?  
The Awareness Question: How do we come to be aware of the self/non-self 
distinction? How do we come to think or treat some things as being parts of 
us? (See Lotze 1846, 126) 
The Question about First-Person Thought: How do we form our first-person 
concept and what is its content when it is formed? (See Lotze 1846, 126-7) 
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I will return to the last question in section 6 and 7. The Awareness Question is 
connected to what today is sometimes called ‘mental ownership’ or ‘sense of 
mineness’ or simply ‘mineness’.5 Lotze claims that the distinction between self/non-
self is based on our thinking already possessing an ‘immediately experienced 
certainty of itself, an earlier for-me(it)-ness [Fürsichsein]’. 6 Mental events and 
processes strike us as belonging to us and not to someone else or to no one at all. 
According to Lotze (and James), we can draw the self/non-self distinction because our 
thoughts and experiences have this immediate for-me-ness. 
 In his approach to these questions Lotze opposes Fichte. According to Fichte, 
the self/non-self distinction is acquired; it is not given in the way our first perceptions 
represent things. We become aware of the self/non-self distinction by what Fichte 
calls ‘Anstoss’. Self is distinguished from non-self when we experience that a striving 
encounters an obstacle and is checked.7 Dilthey provides a concise formulation of the 
basic thought: 
 
The schema of my experience in which my self distinguishes from itself the 
object lies in the relation between the consciousness of willful movement and 
the consciousness of the resistance by which it is met. (Dilthey 1890, 98; my 
translation)8  
 
So in the awareness that our will is checked we come to distinguish our self from the 
rest of the universe. Already the unborn embryo is supposed to possess a ‘dark, 
dreamlike consciousness of the separation of its own life and from a surrounding 
conditioning something’ (Dilthey 1890, 100; my translation).  
 This idea informs the work of physiologists like Johannes Müller and his 
 6 
student Herman von Helmholtz. Helmholtz suggests that the self/non-self distinction 
is the distinction between what we can change by conscious willing and what is 
governed by a force independent of our will.9 What about prima facie passive 
perceivings? They are still under our control in the sense that it is up to us to attend to 
them or not.10 
 According to Fichteans, we feel that we have power over our thoughts, this 
constitutes our sense that these thoughts are ours. Contemporary philosophers take 
this distinction to be drawn by an epistemic property. Campbell is a representative 
example of such an epistemic account of mental ownership. He argues that the 
ordinary notion of ownership has two strands: 
 
Strand 1: ‘For a token thought to be truly mine, the thought must have been 
generated by me.’ (Campbell 2002, 36) 
 
A token is generated by a thinker if it is the product of cognitive dispositions of the 
thinker. 
 
Strand 2: ‘The owner of a thought, we would ordinarily take it, is the one with 
some especially direct access to that thought, who can self-ascribe it otherwise 
than on the basis of observation.’ (ibid.) 
  
Campbell (ibid.) points out that the two strands can come apart. In cases of thought-
insertion, a thinker is under the impression that a thought she can self-ascribe is not 
produced by her. I will set these complications for the two-factor account aside for the 
purposes of this paper.  
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 Lotze’s approach to mental ownership and consequently his approach to first 
person thought puts him in opposition to both Fichteans and the epistemic view. In the 
next section I will introduce Lotze’s comparison between an omniscient angel and a 
crushed worm that he uses to mobilize intuitions that speak against Fichteans as well 
as the Epistemic View.  
 
4. The Cold Angel and the Crushed Worm 
Lotze rejects Fichte’s way of drawing the self/non-self distinction for a theological 
reason. God is a self and can distinguish himself from all other things. This divine 
ability should not depend on the existence of something that is an obstacle to his 
activities.11 He points his readers to a different, ‘easier path’ to his own Anti-Fichtean 
view: 
 
A different consideration has already ([1885] I, p. 249ff [1856, 270 ff]) led us 
by an easier path to the same result, and we may refer the reader for 
explanation and completion to what is said here. The discussion referred to 
showed us that all self-consciousness rests on the ground of an immediate self-
feeling [unmittelbares Selbstgefühl] that cannot arise from the recognition of 
an opposition to the external world, but, in turn, is the cause, that this 
opposition as not comparable to any other opposition between two objects, can 
be sensed [empfunden werden kann]. (Lotze 1885 II, 679-80/1864, 567-8; in 
part my translation)12 
 
If the source of the distinction between self and non-self lies in an immediate feeling, 
it does not require consciousness of willing and experience of Anstoss. A purely 
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passive thinker could come to distinguish itself from the world.  
What is the ‘easier path’ to Lotze’s conclusion? He compares a worm writhing 
in pain with an omniscient angel:  
 
The crushed worm writhing in pain undoubtedly distinguishes its own 
suffering from the rest of the world, though it can understand neither its own 
Ego nor the nature of the external world. But the consummate intelligence of 
an angel, did it lack that feeling, would indeed be capable of keen insight into 
the hidden essence of the soul and of things, and in full light would observe 
the phenomena of its own self-reflection, but it would never learn why it 
should attach any greater value to the distinction between itself and the rest of 
the world than to the numerous differences between things in general that 
presented themselves to its notice. (Lotze 1885 I, 250-1/1856, 272-3) 
 
The angel – let us call him ‘Michael’ – knows everything about himself. Yet he 
cannot conceive of himself as something of special concern: he is for himself only 
one thing among others and he does neither make nor would be able to understand the 
self/non-self distinction. In contrast, the crushed worm let us call him ‘Fafnir’ – lacks 
any knowledge, yet he shows a basic form of self-concern and is, similar, to an 
embryo darkly aware of the self/non-self distinction. However, Fafnir need not be 
able of conscious willing; it only needs to feel pain or pleasure. Hence, Fichteans look 
for the ground the self/non-self distinction in the wrong place.  
Let’s develop the contrast between the crushed worm and the omniscient angel 
in more detail. I will start with the worm. 
 
 9 
4.1 The Crushed Worm  
Fafnir can neither judge that things are so-and-so nor come to know facts about itself 
or its surroundings. Yet, Lotze argues, it distinguishes ‘its own suffering from the rest 
of the world’. Fafnir’s experiences have an ‘immediate for-me(it)-ness’; they are 
given to him ‘as belonging to him’. But this immediate for-me-ness cannot consist in 
self-ascriptions. So what does it consist in? 
Let’s start by setting aside a misleading remark by Lotze. He holds that 
feelings of pleasure and pain do the main work in an account of mental ownership. 
But he sometimes describes these in a misleading way. Sometimes, he calls such a 
feeling ‘self-feeling’ or ‘self-enjoyment’ (Selbstgenuss) and describes it as the feeling 
of the value or worth of identity or a reflexive relation. Consider his description of 
what Michael lacks in comparison to the writhing worm: 
 
This perfect knowledge would indeed imply that our own being [nature] had 
become to us clearly objective [gegenständlich], objective in such a sense, 
however, that our own self would appear to us but one among many objects; 
the intimacy with which in our actual self-consciousness we feel the infinite 
worth of this relating to ourselves [dieser Zurückbeziehung auf uns selbst] 
would still remain unknown and unintelligible. Like all values given to objects 
of thought, this [dieser] too is apprehended only by means of feelings of pain 
and pleasure. Not as thought, but as felt in its immediate value for us does the 
identity of the thinker and the thought form the foundation of our self-
consciousness, and once for all lift the distinction between us and the world 
beyond all comparison with the differences by which it discriminates between 
one object and another. (Lotze 1885 I, 250/1856, 272; my emphasis) 
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In the German text, the gender of the anaphoric pronoun ‘dieser’ in the second 
sentence makes clear that it refers to the value of standing in a reflexive relation. 
Lotze goes on to say, further, that we feel the immediate value of the identity of 
thought and thinker. However, the idea that we feel the value of the obtaining of a 
relation does not sit comfortably with any of the examples Lotze gives. The crushed 
worm is not pained by being identical to itself. Rather, it feels pain in a body part and 
thereby this body part is distinguished from all other parts of the world. Moreover, 
how could my enjoyment that I am having these experiences be the basis for self-
consciousness? It seems already to require the possession of self-consciousness. 
These internal problems suggest that self-feelings do not involve the first-person 
notion or ascribe reflexive relations. We enjoy or are pained by experiences and 
thereby feel their value and ‘own’ them. 
 Let’s expand on this. Fafnir’s experiences or activities have immediate for-
him-ness if, and only if Fafnir takes (non-instrumental) pleasure or pain in them.13 
How are Fafnir’s activities given to him as ‘belonging to him’? By feeling painful or 
pleasurable to him. Lotze frames his answer to the Awareness Question in the third 
volume of Mikrokosmos in terms of mental ownership: ‘in any single feeling the 
being that is for itself [Fürsichseiende] owns itself only in part […]’ (Lotze 1885 II, 
681/1864, 569; my translation). Fafnir owns parts of itself in this sense: the parts 
whose value he feels seem thereby to be his. It owns itself only in part in feeling 
because it enjoys or is pained only by a phase of its activities.  
In order to get a better grip on Lotze’s notion of a non-conceptual sense of 
mental ownership one can think of the sense of ‘my’ that is operative in ‘my friend’ 
and its opposite ‘my foe’. One owns mental activities in felt evaluation in the sense in 
which one is distinctively related to things one loves or hates. Someone is my friend if 
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I non-instrumentally value him or her and s/he values me in the same way. Lotze 
applies this model to the sense of ownership of thoughts and experiences: an 
experience or thought seems to be ours if, and only if, we feel their value by taking 
pleasure or pain in them. Feelings of pain and pleasure apprehend goodness/badness; 
they are felt evaluations.14 All values given to objects of thought are ‘apprehended 
only by means of feelings of pain and pleasure’ (Lotze 1885 I, 250/1856, 272]). If I 
enjoy something, it is intrinsically good; if something pains me, it is intrinsically bad. 
I need no further reasons to evaluate it as good or bad; the feeling suffices.  
James provides another suggestive pair of terms that helps one to grasp the 
sense of ‘being mine’: 
 
This quality of warmth and intimacy and immediacy is what Peter’s present 
thought also possesses for itself. So sure as this present is me, is mine, it says, 
so sure is anything else that comes with the same warmth and intimacy and 
immediacy, me and mine. (James 1890 I, 239. See also ibid, 330-1) 
 
Intimacy and warmth is what I feel towards my friends. (This intimacy can also 
consist in a felt dislike.) In a similar sense, if a thought has intimacy and warmth, it 
feels to be mine.  
Compare this to Fichtean and epistemic views of mental ownership.  
First, the Fichtean view. Since Fafnir may take pleasure in perceiving without 
feeling the Anstoss, Fichteans are on the wrong track. The Anstoss is not necessary for 
drawing the distinction between self and non-self; immediate for-me-ness is. 
Secondly, the epistemic view. The writhing worm is pained by some 
experiences and this makes these experiences seem to belong to him. But the worm 
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cannot self-ascribe the experiences; it cannot recognize or come to know that it has 
the experience in question. But it does not confuse its own mental life, primitive as it 
may be, with external reality.15 Lotze concludes that self-ascription of a mental 
activity or event is not necessary for mental ownership. It is, for example, a ‘fruitless 
wisdom’ to deny self-consciousness to animals (ibid). 16 If a thought seems to be mine 
if, and only if, I take pleasure or pain in it, it is not surprising that we take a special 
interest in our experiences. For if mental ownership requires valuing experiences, the 
mere fact that an experiences seems to be mine makes it an object of distinctive 
interest to me. Things that appear to be valuable attract interest.  
  
4.2 Michael, the Omniscient Affectless Angel, and the Epistemic View 
Michael has in abundance what Fafnir lacks: Michael is omniscient and epistemically 
perfect. Let’s take the complex property P that is a conjunction of all properties that 
Michael has. Michael knows directly and non-observationally that there is exactly one 
thing that has P. Michael can distinguish between himself and everything else: he 
knows that there is only one thing that has P and everything else lacks P. But Michael 
is for himself just ‘one object among many others’. To use James’s picture of two 
unequal halves of the universe, Michael can distinguish himself from everything else 
in the universe, but for him the universe does not divide into a part about which he is 
distinctively concerned and the rest.  
Lotze himself used another picture to make the gap between distinguishing 
knowledge about oneself and concern for oneself vivid: 
 
 [E]ven if we could correctly and accurately enumerate the peculiar 
characteristics that distinguish our soul from others, we should still have no 
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reason to take the idea so acquired for more than the indifferent representation 
[gleichgültige Gemälde] of a being somewhere existent, and as completely 
distinct from a second as a third is from a fourth. If, further, it did not escape 
our notice that the being so clearly seen through in the light of perfect 
knowledge was the very same as that which at this moment completed its 
intuition of itself, we would indeed have given, in this actually accomplished 
self-reflection, the last characteristic crowning touch to the picture of that 
being, but we would still be far from having reached anything so significant as 
what in actual life we know and possess as self-consciousness. (Lotze 1885 I, 
249-250/1856, 272, in part my translation; my emphasis) 
 
Michael has a perfect, but indifferent representation of himself because he lacks what 
the crushed worm has. The crushed worm suffers and feels pain in some parts of its 
body. Michael doesn’t; he may not even have a body. But we can spin out Lotze’s 
example by assuming that there is no thought or perception that pains the bodiless 
Michael; he has not affect at all. He is still able to self-ascribe experiences, yet he 
does not own the experiences he self-ascribes; they don’t seem to him to be his. They 
are for him objects like any other object of which he has knowledge. While Michael 
has perfect knowledge of himself, he and what belongs to him have no special and 
incomparable value for him. He does not care about the mental properties of which he 
has non-observational knowledge any more than about than any other properties he 
knows about. His knowledge of himself is therefore only an indifferent representation 
and he lacks self-consciousness. Fafnir, in contrast, cares about what is his in a 
distinctive way. It does so in an entirely practical way, by taking pleasure and 
unpleasure (pain) in its mental or bodily states. 
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Michael is a thinker who lacks any affect. He can be compared to rare extreme 
cases of Cotard Syndrome. There are some Cotard patients who doubt that they exist 
or they have even come to the belief that they don’t exist. In their place is a machine 
or a collective of things.17 Consider Gerrans’s description of such a severe case:  
 
In this type of case [Cotard’s] the patient conceives of herself as nothing more 
than a locus, not of experience, because, due to the complete suppression of 
affect, her perceptions and cognitions are not annexed to her body, but of the 
registration of the passage of events. She has effectively effaced herself from 
the universe: nothing which occurs is of any significance to her and, hence, 
she describes the world without implicating herself in that description. 
(Gerrans 1999, 603-4, my emphasis) 
 
The fact that the patient no longer distinguishes between herself and everything else 
does not mean that she no longer has privileged access to her thinking and feeling. 
Such patients can still attend to their mental activities and they will immediately know 
that thinking is going on.18 Yet, they don’t think of themselves as distinct from other 
things in the world. Why? Nothing is of distinctive concern to them and hence they no 
longer operate according to a distinction between self and non-self. In this respect 
they and Michael are alike. 
 The case of Michael suggests that infallible and complete knowledge of events 
that manifest one’s capacities for thought do not constitute mental ownership. 
Michael has privileged access to all experiences and thoughts that are exercises of his 
faculties, yet given that he neither values nor disvalues them in taking pleasure or 
being pained by them, these experiences and thoughts are just some further things he 
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knows of, although in a special way. He doesn’t own it in the way you own your 
experiences. The affectless Michael cannot even comprehend ‘why it should attach 
any greater value to the distinction between itself and the rest of the world than to the 
numerous differences between things in general that presented themselves to its 
notice’ (Lotze 1885 I, 250-1/1856, 273).  
Michael’s case points us to a serious problem for the epistemic view of mental 
ownership: one can have non-observational knowledge about something without 
valuing it or being concerned about it. Campbell’s view specifies a distinction 
between things we can know of without observation and ones we can’t. But this 
distinction is not the distinction between what is me and mine and everything else. If I 
have non-observational knowledge of x, it is still an open question whether x is of 
value or disvalue and hence, of interest.19 If I take pleasure in x, this question is 
closed. Taking pleasure in x is a way of evaluating x and taking an interest in it. 
Hence, we need to incorporate felt evaluations – enjoyment and taking displeasure – 
into an account of mental ownership if we want to do justice to the import of this 
notion. I will make a proposal how one can do so in section 7. 
 
5. Objections and Replies 
For Lotze those thoughts and experiences seem to belong to me whose value is 
immediately felt; everything else is for me just a part of the universe and not of 
distinctive concern. The sense of ownership is non-conceptual and non-epistemic as 
Fafnir’s case illustrates. It is also prior to the Fichtean Anstoss. In reflecting on what it 
takes for an experience to be mine, I can become aware of the distinction between 
self/not-self without already appealing to the distinction between myself and an 
external object. 
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So far, so good. There are four pressing objections to Lotze’s answer to the 
Awareness Question. Let’s see whether we can answer them. 
First, we say ‘I can feel your pain’. Can’t I feel Fafnir’s pain when I see it 
writhing with pain? We can be concerned about the mental acts of others, evaluate 
them positively or negatively and feel joy that they feel joy and so on. But only I can 
enjoy or be pained my thinking and perceiving. I may be saddened and pained by my 
friend’s thinking that I let him down. Here we have a propositional object – a fact or 
proposition  – that is the content of my emotion. What pains me is that you are 
currently thinking that I let you down or I take displeasure in learning that you are 
thinking that I let you down. I am not taking displeasure in or am pained in your 
thought. 
Lotze cannot have emotional attitudes in mind that have a propositional 
content. After all, the worm cannot have propositional attitudes. Hence such 
propositional pleasure and pain are irrelevant for mental ownership. Only non-
propositional pleasure or pain in something x, can constitute ownership of x.20 Non-
propositional pleasure or enjoyment is de se: when I take pleasure in hearing the 
melody, the thing that takes pleasure is the same as the one who hears. At the most 
basic level such non-propositional pleasures or pains make for the distinction between 
self and non-self that grounds concern for ourselves and our parts. There are also 
propositional pleasures whose content contains the first-person concept such as my 
pleasure that I (myself) won the race. But Fafnir does not possess any concept and 
cannot have such self-directed pleasures/pains.  
Second, prima facie, I can enjoy bodily activities such as running. If we are 
interested in mental ownership do we need to add a further condition to Lotze’s 
conditions?21 No, on closer inspection one will say that we enjoy these activities 
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because they give us experiences that we enjoy. Strictly speaking, we only enjoy 
mental activities. For example, it makes no sense to say that one enjoyed a taste full 
stop. We need to say in which way and by means of the activity of which sense you 
enjoyed it. If we do so, the proper object of enjoyment will surface. I enjoyed tasting 
the wine by drinking and savoring it. 
 Third, all mental activities that are exercises of my mental powers should have 
immediate for-me-ness, they should seem to be mine. But what about feeling pleasure 
and pain themselves? Brentano wrote with reference to Lotze: 
 
One could object that the hypothesis that every mental activity is accompanied 
by pleasure or displeasure would necessarily lead to an infinite complexity of 
simultaneous acts, since pleasure and displeasure are themselves mental 
activities. (Brentano 1924, 115/2009, 211) 
 
Indeed. If taking pleasure (pain) has immediate for-me-ness, I need to take pleasure 
(pain) in my taking pleasure (pain). Are there, then, second-order pleasure and so on? 
An infinite regress seems to loom.  
To my knowledge Lotze himself never addressed this problem. However, the 
regress does not get going if pleasure and pain are also directed on themselves. And 
this seems independently plausible. Consider Caston’s example: 
 
[W]e like having fun. That is, when we enjoy doing something (and in so far as 
we enjoy doing it), we enjoy our enjoyment. What it is to enjoy ϕ-ing is not, to 
be sure, what it is to enjoy enjoying ϕ-ing. But it does not follow from that this 
higher-order enjoyment is a distinct token activity from the simple enjoyment of 
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ϕ-ing. The connection between the two, in fact, seems to be conceptually 
necessary. To imagine someone who genuinely enjoys an activity, but is 
indifferent to its enjoyment, who fails to enjoy it, seems repugnant to the very 
notion. It would be comparable to someone not liking having fun. Any grounds 
we might have for denying that someone enjoys his enjoyment undermines the 
initial claim that he was actually enjoying ϕ-ing in the first place. (Caston 2002, 
795) 
 
Caston rightly points out one that one need not notice one’s enjoyment of one’s 
enjoyment, and that one can have further attitudes to one’s enjoyment: one can be 
repulsed by one’s enjoyment, desire not to have it, etc. (ibid, 795–6). We can 
therefore offer Lotze a promising solution to his problem. 
Fourth, do all activities that go on at a time seem to be mine because they are 
felt? Yes, answered Lotze: 
 
Whatever stimulations, then, the soul may undergo, from each one we must 
expect an impression of pain or pleasure, and more accurate self-scrutiny, so 
far as it can recognise the washed-out colours of these impressions, confirms 
our conjecture, unable as it is to find any manifestation of our mental activity 
not accompanied by some feeling. The colours are indeed washed-out in the 
matured mind, in contrast to the preponderant interest which we bestow on 
particular ends of our personal endeavours, and deliberate attention is needed 
to detect them, just as microscopic examination is necessary to trace the 
regular formation of invisible objects, which the unassisted eye is wont 
carelessly to overlook. To each simple sensation, each colour, each tone, 
 19 
corresponds originally a special degree of pain or pleasure; but, accustomed as 
we are to note these impressions only in their significance as marks of objects, 
whose import and notion are of consequence to us, we observe the worth of 
these simple objects only when we throw ourselves with concentrated 
attention into their content. (Lotze 1885 I, 242/1856, 262) 
  
If it seems to us that there are affect-free mental episodes, this is so because the 
feeling is like a ‘washed-out colour’. We had this feeling many times before, became 
accustomed to it and it no longer commands our attention. Yet, it is there and can be 
discovered if we can train our attention on it. 
 Brentano followed Lotze in this point.22 But Lotze’s assumption of the 
universal presence of felt evaluations is difficult to make plausible. Whenever Lotze’s 
opponent claims that he thinks a thought without taking pleasure and pain in it, Lotze 
will reply that the emotion is ‘washed-out’; it is so faint that we don’t notice it. Now 
this response saddles Lotze with the problem of giving us an independent reason to 
say that a felt evaluation is present, yet unnoticed. After all, the assumption that the 
felt evaluation is missing is simpler.23 But if there are activities that don’t feel 
pleasant or painful to you, these will not seem to belong to you. Yet, it is in many 
cases implausible that you don’t own them. I may neither take pleasure nor pain in a 
mental activity, yet it can seem to be mine: I can attend to it, exercise power over it 
etc. 
So far Lotze has achieved something: he has provided a sufficient condition 
for mental ownership and made plausible that the complete absence of felt evaluations 
is incompatible with their being a mental subject that is for him or herself an object of 
distinctive concern. Since such a subject can still have privileged access to its present 
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mental activities, Lotze’s considerations give us a reason for re-examining of 
epistemic accounts of mental ownership. But Lotze himself has not provided 
necessary and sufficient conditions of mental ownership. While this makes his 
account of mental ownership at best incomplete, it does not bear negatively on the 
further role felt evaluations are supposed to play in first-person thought. Without 
having taken pleasure and pain in some activities and continuing to do, a thinker 
could not acquire and exercise a first-person concept like ours. Or so I will argue in 
the next sections. 
 
6. The Temptation to Misconstrue the First-Person Concept 
According to Lotze, first-person thought is based on conceptually and metaphysically 
prior immediate for-me-ness: ‘all self-consciousness rests on the ground of an 
immediate self-feeling [unmittelbares Selbstgefühl] that cannot arise from the 
recognition of an opposition to the external world’ (See Lotze 1885 II, 680/1864, 567; 
my translation).  
Immediately after stating the connection between self-consciousness and 
feeling Lotze commented further: 
 
Self-consciousness is only the later attempt to analyze this experienced fact 
with the tools of cognition; to generate a thought image of the self who grasps 
itself with the vivacity of feeling and in this way to put it artificially in the 
realm of objects in which it does not belong. (Lotze 1885 II, 680/1864, 568; 
my translation and emphasis) 
 
If we form a concept of ourselves – the thought image of the self – by analyzing what 
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is distinctive of first-person thought, we are driven to an error: we conceive of us as 
an object like any other.24 Later Wundt made a similar observation about 
philosophical treatments of self-consciousness: 
 
The natural development of self-consciousness already contains the 
preparation of the most abstract formations which philosophy has given this 
concept; only it [philosophy] loves to reverse the process of development by 
putting the abstract self at the beginning. [But] even the speculative 
philosopher is not able to detach his self consciousness from bodily 
presentation and general feeling which form the sensual background of the self 
concept. (Wundt 1880, 219; my translation) 
 
Why do we make such a mistake? In ‘Seele and Seelenleben’ Lotze gives an account 
of the genesis of this mistake:  
 
The faculty of knowledge [die Erkenntnis] can easily attain some concept of 
the soul, can determine the soul by the essential mark of such a reflexive 
relation to itself, but from this does not follow that we think of this so found 
substratum as coinciding [zusammenfallen] with us with that intimacy 
[Innigkeit] as it is always the case when we speak the name ‘I’. (Lotze 1848, 
123-5; my translation) 
 
We easily form a concept that is such that if it is employed, its referent is the same as 
thinker employing it. Why is this concept easily attained? What strikes us when we 
reflect on features of those thoughts that we express by means of the first-person 
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pronoun is that the thinker of the thought is guaranteed to be the object of the thought. 
This feature captures our attention and we gloss the first-person concept as ‘thinker of 
these thoughts’. It seems to me that this part of Lotze’s error theory captures nicely 
many contemporary accounts of the first-person concept. 25  
Now Lotze argued that the concept so attained is not the concept expressed by 
our use of ‘I’. For when we refer to ourselves by means of ‘I’ the coincidence of 
referent and referring subject has a particular intimacy. He elaborates this thought on 
the same page: 
 
One easily sees that someone who says I to himself does not have a mere 
theoretical consciousness of the coincidence of the subject with the object, but 
he feels that this fate befalls himself right now, while he thinks of the general 
case. Just as little as someone could recognize that it was his limb that was in 
pain if he did not evidently feel this inexpressible coincidence of the event 
with his self, without this feeling of unity with ourselves we would not form 
the concept of the self with the energetic inwardness [energischen 
Innerlichkeit] that belongs to it. We would talk of the self just as we talk of 
pain in general, as of an object whose nature we know but that is of no further 
concern to us [uns aber weiter nichts angeht]. (Lotze 1846, 135; my 
translation and emphasis) 
 
When we use ‘I’, we are not only aware that the thinker is the object of thought, we 
also have a particular concern for the object of thought. The second aspect is missing 
if we only focus on the reflexivity of the first-person. Michael, the omniscient but 
affectless angel, can master and employ such a reflexive concept. He knows that for 
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any use of the concept that its user is the referent of the use of the concept. Yet, he 
cannot take a distinctive interest in the object he thinks of in this way. When he uses 
the concept he represents himself as one object like any other object. Hence, the 
reference-rule for the concept leaves something out that is essential for first-person 
thought. When we think of ourselves by means of the first-person concept, we don’t 
think of ourselves as one object among others. 
The same problem arises for epistemic accounts of first-person thought. Setiya 
gives a good exposition of the basic idea that fuels such accounts: 
 
[T]he capacity for self-knowledge is a condition for first-person thought. The 
relation by which I refer to myself in the first person is not simply that of 
being the thinker of these thoughts, but being the object of immediate 
knowledge. The first person concept refers to the one whose thoughts can be 
known in this way. (Setiya 2015, 459) 
 
Again Michael could think of himself by exercising this concept, that is, he can think 
of himself as the object whose thoughts he knows immediately and yet be indifferent 
to the thoughts so known and consequently the object that has them. These thoughts 
and the thinker are for him just further things in the universe that are of no particular 
concern. Again there is no connection between first-person thought and distinctive 
concern. Setiya agrees with this point: 
 
Having the capacity for immediate knowledge of someone does not justify 
non-instrumental interest in his well-being. Why care so much about the one 
you know first-hand, without the need for inference, whose beliefs you can 
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access in a special way? (Setiya 2015, 467) 
 
Lotze’s worm/angel example makes the intuition that motivates Setiya’s question 
vivid. Why should the property x is known about in a special way and the property x 
is of distinctive concern always go hand in hand?  
Lotze concludes that I can think of x in the first-person way without having 
special concern for x. Setiya’s modus ponens is Lotze’s modus tollens. It is a fact that 
we care for something in a distinctive way if we think of it in the first-person way. A 
philosophical account of the first-person concept that does not capture this aspect of 
first-person thought systematically misleading. It misleads us about the fact that 
without felt evaluations we cannot think of ourselves with ‘that intimacy [Innigkeit] 
as it is always the case when we speak the name ‘I’’ (op cit.).  
 Unfortunately Lotze does not flesh out his suggestion about the first-person 
concept. So what must the first-person concept be like such that applying it makes its 
referent an object of concern?  
 
7. Correcting the Mistake: The First-Person Concept as a Thick Concept 
Setiya endorses the view that he capacity for self-knowledge is a condition for first-
person thought and therefore rejects that first-person thought entails specific concern 
for the referent of a token of the first-person concept. Lotze endorsed what Setiya 
rejects and needs therefore to find a different basis for first-person thought. It is not 
the capacity for self-knowledge, but the capacity for enjoying/being pained by mental 
acts is a condition for first-person thought. The first-person concept refers to the thing 
that generates those experiences and thoughts that can be immediately felt in non-
propositional pleasure and pain.  
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We can build on this idea if we think of the first-person concept as 
individuated by a pattern of use, its conceptual role. Let’s first look at a well-known 
model: the logical constants. The sense of logical constants like ‘not’ or ‘and’ is fixed 
by introduction and elimination rules. We know the sense of logical words if we know 
how they contribute to the logical potential of sentences that contain them. For 
example, I master the concept expressed by ‘and’ if and only if I use the following 
introduction and elimination rules for it: 
 
&-Introduction      &-Elimination 
 A, B       A & B 
 A & B       A, B 
 
Campbell (2004, 207) applies this model to the first-person concept. He argues that 
mastery of ‘I’ consists, in part, in moving from perceptions to judgments involving ‘I’ 
and from such judgments to actions: 
 
 I-Introduction     I-Elimination 
 Perception: x is to the right  x is to my right 
x is to my right  Motor: to reach x, move to the right 
 
When I see an object to my right, the way my experience presents the world does not 
include me, only an object that looks to be to the right. But if the world looks that way 
to me, I am entitled to judge that the object is to my right. What makes inferences 
governed by I-introduction good inferences has to do with first-person free content as 
well as the mode in which the content is given. That it visually seems to me that there 
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is, for instance, a tree to the right is part of the reason/entitlement to judge that there is 
a tree to my right. If the same content were presented via testimony, I would not be 
entitled to make the transition to the judgment that there is a tree to my right.26 If a 
thinker’s transitions from perception to judgment and from judgment to action are 
governed by rules like the one above, she masters the first-person concept in part. 
These rules have an epistemic character. If I exemplify this pattern of use, my first-
person judgments will be justified and my actions rational in light of my desires and 
beliefs.27  
 The pattern of use described so far gives us only, as Lotze put it, ‘a theoretical 
consciousness of the coincidence of the subject with the object’ (Lotze 1848, 135; my 
translation). It could be exemplified in Michael’s thinking. The pattern of use defining 
the conceptual role of the first-person concept needs to be enriched by further rules 
that connect felt evaluations and judgments. A first stab at these rules can be gleaned 
from Lotze’s remarks on pain and pleasure: 
 
I*-Introduction    I*-Elimination 
Feeling: ϕ-ing is good/bad   I am ϕ-ing 
I am ϕ-ing      Feeling: ϕ-ing is good/bad. 
 
Read these rules as saying that if something x takes pleasure (unpleasure) in an 
activity ϕ-ing, x is entitled to judge that she herself is ϕ-ing without a further reason. 
The explanation of what makes this rule a good one is similar to the perceptual case. 
If I am aware of the goodness/badness of an act or activity by taking pleasure in it 
(being pained by it), it is my activity. Hence, the rules are truth preserving. Since the 
basis for this judgment is a felt evaluation, I evaluate ϕ-ing and I thereby take an 
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interest in ϕ-ing. If I take an interest in ϕ-ing, I indirectly take an interest in the ϕ-er. It 
seems difficult to see what taking an interest in a thinker would amount to, if not an 
interest in specific properties they have. The object I am referring to with the first-
person concept is an object of concern because the conceptual role that individuates 
the concept is in part given by moves from felt evaluations to self-ascriptions.  
The felt evaluations are basic in the following sense. If the subject cannot 
make transitions from felt evaluations to judgments, she has no conception of herself 
that is similar to the one’s we have, namely as a subject of a distinctive concern. If the 
thinker cannot make these moves, they have no first-person concept. I take this point 
to explicate what Lotze has in mind when he said that ‘all self-consciousness rests on 
the ground of an immediate self-feeling’. 
 So Lotze’s basic idea, expressed in contemporary terminology, is that a 
complete specification of the conceptual role of the first-person concept must include 
felt evaluations. Given that pain and pleasure are felt evaluations, the first-person 
concept has an evaluative component. It is a thick concept that combines evaluative 
and non-evaluative features like the concept murder. 
 
Conclusion 
Lotze’s angel/worm example makes the role of felt evaluations in mental ownership 
and first-person thought vivid. Lotze suggests that our first-person concept is a thick 
concept and that no purely descriptive concept can be our first-person concept. While 
he does not develop an account of this concept, he gives us the materials to do so and 
to criticize the shortcomings in alternative proposals.28 
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1 James’s remark was inspired by Lotze, see ibid. See Kraushaar 1936 for Lotze’s 
influence on James’s philosophy of mind. Brentano referred to Lotze throughout his 
Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint (more in section 5). Fréchette (2013, 658f) 
provides an informative overview of Lotze’s influence the phenomenological 
tradition. On Lotze’s main work Mikrokosmos, see Beiser 2016.  
2 See also Lotze 1885 II, 679-80/1864, 567-8. 
3 See, for example, Campbell 1999 and 2002 and Rosenthal 2005, 354ff.  
4 See Lotze 1885 I, 248/1856, 270-1. 
5 For a discussion of the different concepts that are supposed to capture this and 
related phenomena see Guillot 2017.  
 31 
                                                                                                                                                              
6 See Lotze 1885 II, 679-80/1864, 567-8. I follow Fréchette (2013, 659) in translating 
‘Fürsichsein’ as ‘for me-ness’. The original translation as ‘immediate self-existence’ 
does not get close to the literal meaning.  
7 See, for instance, Fichte (1795, 258 [I, 347]). The noun ‘Anstoss’ is usually 
translated as ‘check’, but one gets a better sense of Fichte’s meaning if one considers 
the verb ‘anstossen’: if one moves one may bump into something (anstossen) and 
hence once movement is hindered. See Smith (2002, 153) for discussion. 
8 I have translated ‘‘willkührlich’ as ‘freely chosen’. See the entry in Grimm’s 
Deutsches Wörterbuch (1854). 
9 See Helmholtz 1878, 241. See also Wundt 1880, 219.  
10  See Lipps 1901, 12. 
11 See Lotze 1885 II, 678/1864, 565-6. 
12 The back reference given in Lotze 1885 II is to pages 241ff. This is close, but 
incorrect. The German edition, Lotze 1864, gives the correct reference. I have 
corrected therefore the reference. 
13 For Lotze’s purposes it is not important that the pleasure or pains are sensory or 
bodily. We might replace the crushed worm with a spirit that can take pleasure and 
pain in its experiences, but is not sophisticated enough to have propositional 
knowledge. 
14 See Pierson 1988, 117f. 
15 Lotze 1846, 126. 
16 See Block (1995, 4.2.1) on a primitive sense of ownership that is independent of 
self-ascription.  
17 See the cases discussed in Billon forthcoming, 10ff. 
18 See ibid. 
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19 See Setiya 2015, 467. I will come back to this point. 
20 On propositional pleasure see Feldman 2004, sect. 4.1. 
21 Lotze (1846, 127) also consider ownership of a body. In brief, those parts of the 
world are my body whose states and/or changes feel pleasurable/painful to me and/or 
whose movements are my successful tryings. 
22 See Brentano 1924, 115/2009, 210ff. 
23 Many thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point. 
24 See also Lotze (1846, 128) on thought images that are not true to the nature of the 
self. 
25 In current work this idea is articulated, for instance, in Peacocke 2015, 83. 
26 Peacocke (2015b, 170) elaborates this further. Under normal circumstances, the 
body to whose right the tree is located is my body. So, under normal circumstances, 
the truth of the content that the tree is to the right when perceptually entertained 
guarantees the truth of content the tree is to my right. 
27 See Campbell 2004, 217. 
28 I presented an earlier version of this material at the workshop Philosophy and the 
Semantics of ‘I’ in Freiburg (Germany) in 2016. I would like to thank the audience for 
discussion. Special thanks for insightful comments go to Matt Parrott and to an 
anonymous referee for an extremely helpful report that helped me to improve the 
paper greatly.  
